Working Paper 98-14
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AFTER WTO
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA
Thomas L. Brewer
Stanley D. Nollen
Tel: 202 944 3750, 202 687 3826; Fax 202 687 4031
E-mail: brewert@gunet.georgetown.edu, nollens@gunet.georgetown.edu
Georgetown University
School of Business
Washington DC 20057
March 1998
We are indebted to participants in a research seminar
at the Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad, to A.N. Siddarthan,
Bibek Debroy, Niranajan Rao, and Michael Gestrin, to Alok Garg and
Yona Han for research assistance, to the Fulbright Senior Scholars
Program for financial support, and to the Indian Council for Research
on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, for facilities support.
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AFTER WTO
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA
Abstract
In this study we examine theoretically the effect of the new WTO
rules on the transfer of knowledge by multinational corporations
to businesses in emerging market economies. We suggest that the
amount and type of knowledge transferred depends on decisions of
MNCs about the mode of their participation in international business
(trading, licensing, direct investment, or strategic alliances).
We suggest that the new WTO rules will change some of these decisions.
We illustrate our theoretical propositions by using case study data
from three foreign invested companies in the information technology
sector in India. Our preliminary indications are that improved intellectual
property protection will have little effect on knowledge transfer
to India, but that new WTO liberalizations of trade and investment
rules will increase wholly owned subsidiaries and trade, which will
increase knowledge transfer but decrease knowledge absorption.
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AFTER WTO
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA
Table of Contents
Abstract
I. The Issues
II. The WTO Agreements
III. Knowledge: What It Is and How to Measure It
IV. Analytical Model
V. Research Design and Empirical Methods
VI. Information Technology in India: Government Policy and Industry
Structure
VII. Business Perspectives from Indian Operations Sources
Tables and Figures
Appendices
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AFTER
WTO:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN
INDIA
I. THE ISSUES
At the turn of the century, multinational corporations face an
unprecedented change in the international business environment.
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round that resulted in the creation
of the World Trade Organization established a new multilateral framework
that extended the liberalization of international trade and investment
into new domains. For the first time, rules are in place to cover
foreign direct investment as well as foreign trade, trade in services
as well as trade in goods, and intellectual property rights (see
United Nations 1995 for an explanation of WTO provisions). National
governments are making substantial public policy changes to conform
to the WTO requirements.
At the firm level, a significant change in management thinking
is taking place: the recognition of knowledge as a major factor
determining international business competitiveness. Traditional
strengths in product-market positioning are being supplemented with
concern to create and utilize knowledge as an enduring, less imitable
source of competitive advantage. The ongoing globalization of business
and the rise of alliance capitalism place the management of knowledge
squarely in the center of business strategy.
The new WTO rules, not coincidentally, address the management of
knowledge, especially the transfer of knowledge in international
business transactions. This is self-evident in the regulations that
affect intellectual property rights. It is also apparent in the
WTO information technology agreement, and indirectly in the liberalization
of foreign direct investment as well as in the general principle
of transparency.
The transfer of knowledge, or technology, has always been of particular
interest to developing countries. Some of these countries, and the
previously industrialized countries of central and eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, are emerging market economies that
offer new trade and investment opportunities for multinational corporations.
These formerly partially closed economies are changing from decades
of central planing, socialist development, and state ownership of
industry to more open market economies, capitalist development,
and privatization of industry. They are making dramatic changes
in their national policies that affect international business. Accordingly,
the scope for change in the transfer of knowledge from multinational
corporations to emerging market economies is very large as well
as very important. However, exactly what change actually takes place
depends on decisions made in the MNCs; they are the economic agents
that significantly influence the type, method, and rate of knowledge
transfer.
The role of MNCs in technology transfer and the economic development
of less-developed countries has been a contentious issue, especially
in the 1950s and 1960s. The debate has been quiescent recently,
but is certain to be rejoined precisely because of the centrality
of knowledge in both the new WTO framework and the new thinking
about business strategy.
A widespread expectation is that the liberalization of trade and
investment policies by governments will increase transfers of knowledge
from MNCs to emerging market economies. The reasons are straight-forward.
Liberalized trade and investment means more trade and investment
and therefore more knowledge transfer, and better protection of
intellectual property rights means more willingness on the part
of MNCs to transfer knowledge.
However, a closer look raises doubts. If the new WTO rules cause
MNCs to change the mode of their participation in international
business, e.g., from direct investment to trade or from joint ventures
with local companies to wholly owned subsidiaries, then knowledge
transfer might be decreased. If the new public policy framework
facilitates strategic alliances among global oligopolists that local
companies in emerging market economies cannot join, then knowledge
transfer to them might be decreased.
Alternatively, public policy changes at the macro level might have
little effect on micro business decisions made according to direct
influences from costs, prices, and market competition. In any event,
knowledge transfer may depend mostly on the ability of the host
country to receive it rather than the willingness of the MNC to
send it.
The research question to be investigated is: How is the transfer
of knowledge by multinational corporations to foreign operations
in emerging market economies affected by the new rules on international
trade and investment? The new rules include the provisions of the
WTO agreements and the accompanying changes in national government
policies. In seeking answers to this research question, our immediate
purposes are to assess the knowledge outcomes for foreign business
operations and for host economies that follow from the WTO initiatives,
and to improve understanding of firm-level decision making.
In the paper that follows, we describe the new trade and investment
policies embodied in WTO and in national government policies. We
define knowledge and its measurement. We suggest how the decisions
of multinational corporations determine knowledge transfer. To do
so, we develop a theoretical framework and deduce propositions for
empirical investigation. We make use of field research conducted
among foreign-related businesses in India to suggest preliminary
answers to the research question.
II. THE WTO AGREEMENTS
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations
in Marrakesh created the World Trade Organization in January 1995.
The WTO breaks new ground in the liberalization of international
business transactions by bringing three new domains into its rule-making:
Foreign direct investment, trade in services, and intellectual property
rights. The WTO applies three general principles established in
previous trade agreements to these new domains, which are most favored
nation, national treatment, and transparency. The WTO contains five
agreements that contain new rules that are relevant to the substance
of knowledge transfer issues. They are trade-related intellectual
property rights (TRIPs), general agreement on trade in services
(GATS), trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), subsidies and
countervailing measures (SCMs), and the information technology agreement
(ITA). We explain the main provisions of these agreements below
(see Table 1 for a summary and list of sources).
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
TRIPs requires that governments provide national treatment and
most favored nation status for intellectual property rights transactions,
it sets out specific standards for each of several types of intellectual
property, and it requires governments to establish enforcement procedures.
The specific standards include patent protection for both products
and processes for 20 years, copyright protection for 50 years, trademark
and service mark protection for 7 years (renewable), integrated
circuit design and industrial design protection for 10 years, and
trade secrets protection. In addition, anti-competitive practices
in licensing contracts that violate intellectual property rights
are subject to legal remedies. All of these specific standards and
the enforcement procedures have implementation deadlines.
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
GATS covers both trade and foreign direct investment in services
(but not goods) (and is therefore misnamed by the omission of an
I after the T). It distinguishes four modes of services supply,
including exports and imports, tourism, and expatriates, as well
as foreign direct investment in services. Like TRIPs, GATS requires
most favored nation status as a general obligation, but it permits
many exceptions. For example, regional free trade pacts do not have
to treat all nations the same, nor does government procurement itself.
Other general obligations include transparency of services trade
and investment measures, and prohibition of restrictive business
practices.
The rest of GATS consists of sector-by-sector agreements. These
sectoral agreements should provide market access for foreign companies,
national treatment, and unrestricted international payments. One
of the sectors for which WTO agreement has been reached is telecommunications.
The essential provision is that governments agree to provide access
to public networks and services to all suppliers of telecommunications
except broadcast and cable radio and television companies. However,
developing countries may impose conditions. Another one of these
sectors is termed basic telecommunications, for which an agreement
was reached only in February 1997. Aside from applying to several
different services from those covered in the prior telecommunications
agreement, this new agreement requires countries to permit foreign
ownership of telecommunications facilities and it asks for pro-competitive
internal regulatory principles.
Other sectoral agreements in GATS are country-by-country. A member
country offers specific commitments for specific industries. The
commitments from a country may apply to only one industry, or they
may apply to all industries in the country (the latter are termed
horizontal commitments). There need be no commonality among the
various countries' commitments.
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
Trade-related investment measures are incentives or requirements
imposed by governments that affect foreign direct investments, usually
via the trade that flows from them. The TRIMs agreement in WTO covers
investment in manufactured goods, but not other goods or services.
It contains strong provisions with implementation deadlines. TRIMs
prohibits local or domestic content requirements in production,
it prohibits trade balancing requirements and foreign exchange neutrality
requirements, and it prohibits domestic sales requirements tied
to export sales.
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs)
Subsidies are defined as financial contributions provided directly
or indirectly by a government which confer benefits to certain enterprises.
The WTO agreement prohibits some subsidies (red light subsidies),
and limits others (amber light subsidies), but permits still others
(green light subsidies). In particular, the WTO agreement bars export
subsidies that are contingent on export performance or local content
(this is therefore also a TRIMs-like provision), though the least-developed
countries are exempted from this rule and may provide such subsidies.
The agreement also bars domestic subsidies that are tied to the
use of domestic rather than imported goods. Other subsidies are
permitted but may be countervailed depending on their size and application.
Some subsidies are not only permitted, but may not be combated.
Perhaps in recognition that these rules taken together contain
several possibilities for conflicting interpretations, a "permanent
group of experts" is established to make determinations prior to
formal dispute settlement.
Information Technology Agreement
The information technology agreement, reached in December 1996
(two years after the Uruguay Round was finished), covers trade in
information technology products accounting for 80 percent of all
world trade in these types of products. The requirement of member
countries is to eliminate all tariffs on products contained in the
list of the agreement by the year 2000. The two main product categories
are telecommunication equipment and computer equipment.
The Role of National Government Policies
The WTO is a membership organization whose multilateral agreements
are made effective in the public policies of its member countries.
Decisions of MNCs about managing knowledge in their foreign business
operations depend on the way in which national governments implement
WTO agreements, and on national public policies that need not all
be responses to WTO. Therefore we need to understand the regulations
of a particular country that apply to a particular industry in order
to study empirically the transfer of knowledge.
III. KNOWLEDGE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO MEASURE IT
Everyone knows generally what knowledge is, and a definition is
scarcely necessary. In this study, knowledge is the outcome of interest
that must be measured in some way, so we briefly discuss what it
means. The closest synonym for knowledge is information, but that
does not capture the full meaning. Information is a neutral or positive
term that denotes facts and data. Knowledge implies understanding.
It incorporates a portion of wisdom, learning, intelligence, know-how.
Knowledge is multidimensional.
In this study we do not distinguish knowledge from technology.
However, some researchers maintain differences in the meaning of
these two similar concepts, and so we mention them briefly here.
Technology often refers to the physical sciences and implies hardware,
although those restrictions are not necessary. We can speak of hard
technology and soft technology, the latter including social sciences,
and therefore organizational knowledge. To some, technology is concrete
and is applied immediately to tasks, whereas knowledge is somewhat
more abstract and useful far into the future. We use the term knowledge
in this paper to cover all of these meanings.
Types of Knowledge
In the management literature, knowledge has been discussed according
to several alternative dichotomous types (see, for example, Inkpen
1996, Kogut and Zander 1993). The most useful type for our purpose
is to describe knowledge as either explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge
is articulated, codified, and tangible. It is communicated by formal
language. Examples of explicit knowledge include data bases, operating
manuals, and blueprints. On the other hand, tacit (or implicit)
knowledge is unexpressed, and it is only partly conscious while
remaining partly intuitive. It is harder to learn and to share with
others than explicit knowledge. Examples of tacit knowledge are
the some of the manual skills of craftsmen and the interpersonal
skills of successful supervisors. Clearly the ability to transfer
knowledge varies with its explicitness, and so does the method to
be used for accomplishing the transfer.
There are two other ways to characterize knowledge dichotomously.
Product knowledge is the specifications and performance features
that characterize a good or service, or "what" knowledge, while
process knowledge is "how" knowledge - how to design, engineer,
manufacture, or distribute a good or service. Embodied knowledge
is contained within a product or process and cannot be separated
from it even though it might be explicit, while disembodied knowledge
is free-standing knowledge that is detachable from the product or
process whether or not it is explicit or tacit.
The transfer of knowledge from a multinational corporation to a
foreign operation cannot simply be reckoned by a single quantitative
indicator of its amount. Unless we restrict our inquiry to a single,
narrow, homogeneous case, we require multiple metrics for multiple
dimensions of knowledge.
Dynamics of Knowledge Transfer
It is incomplete to describe what knowledge is unless we also explore
how it is changed. Knowledge transfer is dynamic. Knowledge can
be adapted when it is transferred, absorbed by the recipient to
varying degrees, and it can be created as well as transferred.
Knowledge transfer across countries as well as across companies
is not likely to be a purely mechanistic process. Instead the knowledge
that is transferred is likely to be adapted to some extent in order
to fit better the local circumstances. Not even McDonald's franchises
are managed exactly the same way in all the different countries
to which this company knowledge is transferred. Differences between
home country and host country in national culture, and differences
between home company and host company in company culture are likely
to motivate adaptations in the knowledge that is transferred (Newman
and Nollen 1996). Differences in production technologies, labor
and capital resources and costs, infrastructure, consumer market
characteristics, and national cultures all imply differences in
appropriate technologies and therefore adaptation of knowledge along
with its transfer.
In the case of emerging market economies, the question of adaptation
leads also to the question of knowledge absorption. Here the potential
for conflict between MNC and host country is present. The MNC's
interest often is to retain for its own exclusive use the knowledge
that it considers to be a proprietary asset, and therefore it will
transfer knowledge only if it can do so without loss. The explanation
of foreign direct investment in terms of internalization is built
on this idea.
But the interest of the host country often is to utilize the transferred
knowledge beyond the original purpose for which it was transferred
- to generalize the knowledge and apply it to other products or
processes, or to learn the knowledge and make it indigenous and
independent of its original foreign source. If the transferred knowledge
has value to the host country beyond the immediate business relationship
in which it was transferred, then the knowledge is absorbed.
A third aspect of the dynamics of knowledge transfer is the potential
for knowledge creation. Business relationships between MNCs from
advanced industrialized countries and companies in emerging market
economies will not customarily have knowledge creation as an objective
in the same way that strategic alliances between similar companies
in similar countries often do. Nevertheless, knowledge might be
created in a sequential fashion from these relationships.
Measures of Knowledge
The measurement of knowledge that is transferred from one firm
or one person to another is fraught with difficulties. Because knowledge
is multidimensional, multiple measures are desirable. If knowledge
is context-specific - if its value depends on the situation - then
the measures of knowledge may change from one case to another unless
the cases are quite homogeneous. Even in a given case, one piece
of knowledge may have more value than another and thus needs to
be weighted unequally. For example, knowledge that is critical to
firm performance and difficult to obtain is especially valuable.
We begin by examining the channels through which knowledge flows.
Some channels are communication media, either oral or written. Two
such media are the exchange of unique messages between individuals
(by telephone, e-mail, fax, or memo), and the dissemination of documents
in common to a wider audience (such as newsletters, papers, and
journals). (These examples and some of those to follow are found
in Appleyard 1996, Inkpen 1996, and Inkpen 1995.) These media can
transfer explicit, disembodied knowledge.
Two other methods for transferring knowledge rely on the movement
of people rather than messages. Groups of people can gather at meetings
or conferences at one firm or another or at a third location to
transfer knowledge even if there is another ostensible purpose for
the conference. Individuals can make one-on-one visits to another
firm. An engineer might work alongside a colleague in a foreign
location for a few days or weeks, or an expatriate manager might
spend three or five years abroad. These methods, like on-the-job
training, can transfer tacit, process knowledge. However, they are
not ideal as measures of knowledge transfer because they measure
inputs - amount of knowledge sent, or knowledge transfer opportunities
- rather than outputs, or amount received or learned.
An output-oriented measure of knowledge that has been used empirically
is patent citations (Almeida 1996). If one individual or firm cites
another's patent in his or her own new patent application, we presume
that the knowledge contained in the earlier patent has been transferred.
Other potential measures in a similar vein include technology agreements,
marketing agreements, and supplier agreements among firms that contain
drawings, manuals, or business plans that are apprehended by all
signatories.
A conceptually ideal output measure of knowledge transfer would
be a quantitative report of changes in business operations such
as labor productivity, product quality, or unit cost, or changes
in financial results such as sales revenue, profitability, or market
share. A major drawback to this type of measure is that it is determined
by multiple causes, only one of which is specific instances of knowledge
transfer.
Finally, a qualitative indicator of knowledge transfer is expert
opinion. We can ask managers to rate the amount of knowledge transferred.
This technique is scientifically acceptable if suitable questions
can be devised, respondents obtained, and scales created.
IV. ANALYTICAL MODEL
To understand how the amount and type of knowledge that MNCs transfer
to emerging market economies changes because of international trade
and investment liberalizations, we examine two foreign market entry
decisions made by MNCs: the objectives for their entry, and the
modes of their participation.
Business Objectives and International Business Modes
If the MNC's objective is to invest abroad for efficiency-seeking
reasons (e.g., to locate R&D activities abroad, or to establish
a strategic alliance to take advantage of a partner's competence),
then knowledge transfer itself is a primary focus. However, if the
firm's investment objective is market seeking or raw material seeking,
or if an investment is made to avoid government-imposed trade barriers,
then knowledge transfer has a secondary role (Brewer 1993).
The modes of international business participation include exporting
and importing, licensing, foreign direct investment in joint ventures
or wholly owned subsidiaries, and non-equity strategic alliances
or contractual agreements. Knowledge transfer possibilities differ
among these modes. For example, exporting can transfer explicit,
embodied, product knowledge only. Foreign direct investment can
transfer explicit or tacit knowledge about products or processes
that is embodied or disembodied. Absorption of knowledge will be
larger in joint ventures than in wholly owned subsidiaries (Table
2). If we combine differences in knowledge transfer possibilities
by mode with effects of WTO agreements on choice of mode, we can
predict changes in knowledge transfer outcomes (Figure 1).
Inferences from Theories of International Trade and
Investment
The WTO agreements lessen government intervention,
strengthen the operation of free markets, and improve safeguards
for private property. They require governments to provide national
treatment and improve transparency. Ricardian international trade
theory argues that the result will be more trade as businesses pursue
newly available opportunities that arise from lower tariffs, fewer
trade restrictions on investments, and fairer competition with domestic
firms as the international business environment becomes more stable,
predictable, and open. Moreover, the composition of trade should
be altered to favor exports of knowledge-intensive products and
services by MNCs from advanced industrialized countries that are
relatively knowledge (or human capital) abundant, according to factor
proportions theory.
Among theories to explain foreign direct investment,
one of the principal arguments is the internalization concept. MNCs
enter foreign markets by investing in wholly owned subsidiaries
in order to obtain returns from their proprietary knowledge. This
knowledge is internalized rather than sold externally (by licensing)
either because the return is higher or the risk of loss of knowledge
in another mode (such as joint venture or strategic alliance) is
too great (Dunning 1993).
If we look into the provisions of the WTO agreements
in the light of trade and investment theories, we see conflicting
implications for knowledge transfer.
TRIPs. The TRIPs provisions should generally
increase the interest of foreign firms that possess valuable proprietary
knowledge to do business in emerging market economies because their
knowledge will be better protected from the risk of loss. However,
some modes of participation will be benefited more than others.
Licensing will be particularly benefited because it is the outright
sale of explicit disembodied knowledge services. The TRIPs requirement
to grant process as well as product patents expands the domain for
safeguarded licensing. TRIPs also favors direct investment in joint
ventures rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. Disembodied product
and process technology that is transferred into a joint venture
by a foreign MNC parent is subject to absorption by the local partner
because of its involvement in management and is therefore subject
to the risk of loss. TRIPs reduces this risk in principle. Investment
in wholly-owned subsidiaries does not encounter this potential problem,
and thus gets less of a gain from TRIPs. Strategic alliances are
favored like joint ventures for the same reason (Table 3).
GATS. The GATS agreement will stimulate direct
investments and alliances as modes of participation in international
business more than exporting or licensing simply because many services
cannot be traded but rather must be produced where they are consumed
(only one of the four GATS modes of supply is trade). The GATS requirements
for market access and unrestricted international payments in industries
for which countries make commitments to WTO will increase especially
direct investments in wholly owned subsidiaries and majority-owned
joint ventures to the extent that limitations on foreign equity
stakes are raised or removed. If 100 percent or 51 percent equity
stakes are made possible where previously only minority joint ventures
were permitted, some MNCs will choose wholly owned subsidiaries
or majority owned joint ventures. The effect of these switches in
mode induced by GATS will be to increase the amount of knowledge
transferred but to reduce knowledge absorption by the host country.
TRIMs. The TRIMs agreement, by eliminating
domestic content and trade balancing requirements, means that foreign-invested
operations will not have to make components locally. Thus foreign
direct investments that were operated to conform with these requirements
now can decrease in size and number. Instead, imports of components
from home country to host country operations will increase. These
actions will reduce knowledge transfer, especially disembodied knowledge
that is adapted and absorbed, including both product and process
knowledge. On the other hand, fewer restrictions on foreign investment
generally will induce new investments, but primarily in "screwdriver"
assembly plants that would transfer a minimum amount of knowledge.
SCMs. The SCMs agreement bars export subsidies
and therefore takes away an advantage of direct investments and
strategic alliances established by foreign MNCs as export platforms;
these modes and objectives are therefore discouraged by SCMs. Domestic
subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic rather than
imported goods are also barred; this liberalization favors the trade
mode. SCMs also subjects some domestic subsidies to countervailance,
which will enable foreign companies to serve local markets without
artificial disadvantage, in all modes.
ITA. The Information Technology Agreement,
by eliminating tariffs on imports of telecommunication and computer
products, will switch some international business participation
from investment to trade to the extent that direct investment was
motivated in the first place by the avoidance of trade barriers.
The transfer of knowledge, except explicit embodied knowledge, will
consequently be reduced. However, to the extent that trade and investment
are complements rather than substitutes, investment will increase,
and thus the overall effect of reduced tariffs on knowledge transfer
is in doubt.
In summary, the new WTO agreements will stimulate
trade and licensing, both of which are limited in the amount and
type of knowledge transferred. The effects on foreign direct investment
are theoretically mixed. Both TRIMs and SCMs might cause less investment,
for which trade is substituted, but both may also increase investment
via other mechanisms. In any event, WTO rules in GATS favor wholly-owned
subsidiaries and majority-owned joint ventures among FDI modes.
The implications for knowledge transfer are mixed. Some WTO agreements
favor the growth of strategic alliances. By protecting intellectual
property and reducing government subsidies, the risk-sharing and
cost-sharing advantages of alliances, especially those that focus
on research and development, are magnified while the chance of loss
of proprietary assets is diminished.
Although strategic alliances have high knowledge-transferring
potential, they may not achieve the transfer for some emerging market
economies. Strategic alliances among MNCs tend to be organizationally
complex, they operate via cybernetic knowledge creation-diffusion
feedback processes, and they are intensive in tacit knowledge (Ostry
and Gestrin 1993). It is difficult for companies from developing
countries to participate in these alliances that require considerable
company and country investment in infrastructure-like "absorptive
capacity." In addition, strategic alliances may themselves adopt
restrictive or anti-competitive private business practices.
Modern additions to trade theory, not so far considered,
focus on the role of market imperfections, the strategies of large
oligopolists, and the competitiveness of domestic industries. The
WTO promises to reduce some market imperfections via improved intellectual
property rights and reduced subsidies, and in this way to generally
improve the functioning of markets. However, the effect of WTO on
the market structure and performance of domestic industries cannot
be predicted in general and awaits empirical study.
Propositions
The key proposition to be empirically investigated
is that liberalizations in government trade and investment policies,
stimulated in part by new WTO rules, will change the decisions of
MNCs about the mode of their participation in international business
and therefore change the amount and type of knowledge transferred.
Specifically,
- TRIPs will result in more explicit disembodied
knowledge transfer via more licensing, and more knowledge transfer
of all types via more FDI in joint ventures and strategic alliances
- Both TRIMs and ITA will result in less knowledge
transfer and absorption via less direct investment for which trade
is substituted, unless overall trade-investment complementarity
dominates
- The effect of GATS on knowledge transfer is uncertain;
it will increase the transfer via more direct investment and alliances,
but the transfer of tacit knowledge that is absorbed will be decreased
because of more wholly owned subsidiaries.
Knowledge transfer depends on other features of the
MNC's international business decision, two of which we take into account
in this study. (4) Knowledge transfer varies with the purpose of the
international business participation: Efficiency-seeking direct investments
and some strategic alliances have knowledge transfer objectives while
market-seeking and trade barrier-avoiding investments do not; and
(5) Knowledge transfer will be greater if the amount of value added
in the foreign business is greater.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
To examine the propositions we need original firm-level
data that is specific to both industry and country. The industry
must be specified because some WTO rules are industry-specific,
and because national government policies on trade and investment
vary by industry. The country must be specified because some WTO
rules and most implementation timetables vary according to the economic
development status of the country. In addition, national governments
can meet WTO requirements in a variety of ways, especially GATS
requirements.
We choose the information technology sector, consisting
of the telecommunication and computer industries, because it is
one of the few sectors for which a GATS agreement in the WTO has
been reached, and therefore new rules exist for it. It is a global
high technology industry that produces both goods and services.
It previously encountered many restrictive public policies. We choose
India because it is a big emerging market economy that has recently
undertaken substantial liberalization measures, both unilaterally
before WTO rules were put into place, and in response to WTO rules
since 1995. India is a WTO member. Because India has a stratum of
highly qualified scientists and engineers, absorptive capacity in
human resources should not be a constraint, and in fact knowledge
creation in India, not just transfer to India, should be a realistic
possibility.
Empirical research is carried out initially in a
small number of intensive case studies of business collaborations
between MNCs and Indian companies. This type of field research is
suitable for analyzing managerial decisions of complex problems,
and it will enable the analytical framework to be developed further
and hypotheses and measurements to be refined. Subsequently survey
research is to be conducted so that quantitative data can be statistically
analyzed. In this paper we report on the first results from company
case studies.
VI. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA:GOVERNMENT
POLICY AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
In this section, we summarize the current status
of Indian government policy on trade and investment, especially
as it affects the information technology industry. Until 1991, India
was to a large extent a closed economy with bans against imports
of many products, very high tariffs on many other products, maximum
foreign equity stakes of 40 percent on direct investments, and licensing
requirements to engage in almost any business activity. Most of
the current policies stem from the start of reforms in 1991 (some
reforms were initiated by the government of Rajiv Gandhi in the
mid-1980s). We also review the structure of the information technology
sector in India (a more complete description of both, with sources,
is given in the appendices).
Indian Trade and Investment Policy
Foreign Direct Investment. For many industries,
foreign direct investments in joint ventures with foreign equity
stakes ranging from 50 to 74 percent are automatically approved
by the Reserve Bank of India. Telecom and computing equipment produced
in joint ventures with up to 51 percent foreign equity is automatically
approved. Other investments must be specifically approved by the
Foreign Investment Promotion Board. Foreign investments in telecom
and computing equipment can reach 100 percent via this route. Foreign
investment in telecom services businesses is limited to 49 percent
for basic services and for cellular mobile services and radio paging
services, and to 51 percent for other value-added services, all
by specific FIPB approval. In the computer services and engineering
services businesses, the maximum foreign equity stake is 51 percent.
There are no domestic content or trade balancing
requirements for telecom or computer investments, although there
are for other industries such as motor vehicles and consumer goods
industries. The rupee exchange rate is flexible and market determined,
and is fully convertible on current and capital account for foreign
investors, though not for Indians. Telecommunication is regarded
as infrastructure and therefore enjoys fiscal benefits such as tax
holidays and concessional import duties.
Technology transfer is officially encouraged and
considered as part of foreign direct investment proposals in India's
GATS commitments, although there are some restrictions on payments
for foreign technology.
Imports and Exports. Imports of capital goods
used in manufacturing carried a flat 20 percent tariff in 1997,
which could be reduced to 10 percent or zero if certain export targets
were met. The tariff on telecom parts and subassemblies was 30 percent
in 1997. The average tariff over all imports was 33 percent in 1997.
India signed the Information Technology Agreement in 1997, which
mandates tariff reductions to zero by the year 2000 for listed telecom
and computer equipment.
Quotas that restrict imports of many products still
exist, mainly for consumer goods. Several telecom products, such
as cellular telephones and pagers, are subject to quotas and require
a license from the government to import. These quotas are the subject
of a dispute settlement procedure in WTO; they must be removed by
WTO rules, and the dispute is about the timetable.
Intellectual Property Rights. Indian intellectual
property rights protection, though perceived to be very poor in
surveys of business people (Mansfield 1994), appears to meet WTO
standards in most respects except patents and, perhaps, enforcement.
India will need to grant product patent protection for pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and food products, which are not covered now, and lengthen
process and product patent life to 20 years.
Indian Information Technology Sector
The definition of the telecommunication industry
in accordance with WTO terms is the transmission of voice or data
messages from senders to receivers by electromagnetic means. The
industry manufactures products that are equipment for transmission
(such as cables), switching, and end users (such as telephones).
The industry supplies two types of services: basic services that
simply transmit but do not change the form or content of the customer's
information (such as voice telephone and fax), and value-added services
in which the telecom company changes the form or content of the
customer's information or stores and retrieves it (such as voice
mail, e-mail, and mobile cellular telephone (see Figure 2).
The telecommunication industry in India is sizable,
with total expenditure on telecom services and equipment of $6.5
billion in 1995 (Voice & Data 1997). It is an industry
of opportunity since India has one of the lowest telephone densities
in the world, and growth has been rapid since the 1991 liberalizations
Basic telecommunication - local and domestic long distance telephone
and fax service through fixed wires - is provided by government
monopolies. However, one private company is being licensed to compete
with the government monopoly to provide local telephone (but not
domestic long distance) service in each of India's states and principal
cities. Basic international telecom services are provided by another
government monopoly, which will continue until at least until the
year 2004.
Value-added telecommunication - email, cellular mobile
telephone, radio paging, satellite data transmission - was first
available in India in 1995, and is supplied by private sector companies,
most of whom are joint ventures with foreign MNCs. However, international
value-added services are restricted by the requirement to use the
government monopolist's facilities.
The telecom industry is regulated by a new government
agency established in 1997 that is intended to be independent of
the government's interests in providing telecom services.
The computer industry includes hardware and software
products and consulting and training services. Hardware includes
desktop and laptop computers, workstations, servers, and mainframes,
and peripheral devices such as printers and networking products.
Software includes system software and applications software.
In India the computer industry had revenues of $3.7
billion in 1996-97, with software constituting a slightly larger
share of the total than hardware (Dataquest 1997. More than
two-thirds of Indian software output was exported, and it was a
major factor in total Indian exports. The computer industry grew
at a rapid rate - about 38 percent - in 1996-97, with software growth
leading the way. Several of India's leading computer companies are
joint ventures with foreign MNCs or have non-equity technology collaborations.
VII. BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES FROM INDIAN OPERATIONS
The experiences of foreign-invested companies in
the information technology business in India yield insights into
entry mode and knowledge transfer issues. In this paper we analyze
case study information from three joint ventures and wholly owned
subsidiaries operating in India, which are described in the three
paragraphs below. The sources are personal interviews with 3-6 top
managers in the Indian business and its Indian and U.S. parent companies
in 1997, and company documents.
Hughes Escorts Communications Ltd (HECL) is
a joint venture that started operations in February 1995. It is
51% owned by Hughes Network Systems (HNS), which is the maximum
foreign stake permitted, and 49% owned by Escorts Group. HNS is
a unit of Hughes Electronics, which is owned by General Motors.
The Escorts Group is India's 20th biggest business conglomerate.
It has a diverse range of manufacturing businesses, including telecom
equipment, many of which are conducted with foreign collaborators.
HECL's business is to provide shared hub satellite transmission
of data and fax domestically for business customers in India using
VSATs (very small aperture terminals).
Sprint RPG India Ltd is a 50-50 joint venture
between Global One and RPG Enterprises, formed in 1994. The foreign
parent company, Global One, is a joint venture among Sprint (U.S.),
Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom. RPG Industries, the Indian
parent, is the 5th largest diversified business conglomerate
in India. Sprint RPG's main business is to provide email service
within India for business customers using leased lines. Sprint RPG
does not export any services, and does not import parts or services
except for maintenance services from Sprint and maintenance parts
from Tandem, the supplier of the computers that power the email
service.
HCL-HP was formed in 1991 formed as joint
venture between Hewlett Packard (HP), which took a 26% blocking
minority stake (the maximum foreign stake permitted then was 49
percent), and Hindustan Computers Ltd. HP is one of the largest
computer companies in the world, and HCL is India's largest computer
maker and marketer. HCL-HP's main business was to assemble and market
computers, ranging from entry-level personal computers to high-end
servers and work stations. In 1992, HCL-HP invested $3 million to
build a new manufacturing facility for computers. In 1997 the equity
joint venture ended and was converted to a non-equity strategic
alliance. HP bought out HCL's interest and created Hewlett Packard
India Ltd as a wholly-owned subsidiary (investment rules had been
relaxed to permit 100 percent foreign-owned companies in the computer
industry). HP India stopped assembling computers in India, and instead
became a marketing organization for its computers that it imported.
HCL is the exclusive distributor for all HP computers. In addition,
HCL reorganized itself into separate operating companies, one of
which was HCL Consulting, an R&D profit center formed out of
the technology activities of HCL-HP.
Mode of Participation
Based on three sets of company experiences, it appears
that joint ventures were chosen - before WTO came into effect but
after Indian liberalizations had begun - because of market reasons
and Indian government regulations. Company managers at HECL and
Sprint RPG explained the decision process in a market that is very
foreign to western companies:
In all of Hughes' VSAT satellite data transmission
business worldwide, there are joint ventures only in Italy and
India. Elsewhere, Hughes exports VSATs from the U.S. We chose
a joint venture for India because we needed local market knowledge,
familiarity with government officials, and facilities that an
Indian partner could provide. We could have licensed a company
like Escorts and exported to it. But a foreign company needs an
Indian company with a recognized name and a good reputation to
gain position in the marketplace. The success rate for licensing
arrangements is only 20%. Because Hughes owns 51% it has management
control.
Sprint could have exported the hardware, licensed
the software, and made a service or maintenance agreement. But
what Indian company could have successfully launched an email
business in 1994? You have to know how to manage the business.
Could an Indian company have paid the start up costs and sustained
early losses? It takes deep pockets. . Back in 1994 we saw liberalization
of Indian government policies ahead, a big market in the future,
several lines of products and services we could add year by
year, and a chance to become a turnkey telecom provider for
business customers in India. To do this we have to operate in
India and make an investment. The "whole business" concept was
our rationale. For a small investment of $5 million we find
a partner, make a business plan, and open an office. We lose
a few million dollars for a few years, but we have our flag
on the map.
Hewlett Packard created a joint venture because it needed
"more feet on the street" and HCL already had 40 sales offices and
140 service locations in India. The tariffs on imported components
were much lower than the tariff on finished products, so HP wanted
to assemble computers in India. The equity joint venture ended six
years later in part because successive liberalizations of trade policy
made manufacturing in India unnecessary. By 1997 the import tariff
on finished computers was down to 22 percent (it had been 300 percent)
while the import tariff on components was 10 percent. This narrower
gap persuaded HP to stop importing components and assembling them
in India, and instead to import finished products and become a marketing,
not a manufacturing company in India. Other considerations that broke
up the HCL-HP joint venture were reflected in views of HP India managers:
We have a longer term view of business in India
now and some experience here. Tariffs are down. We want to control
our own destiny. . Aside from HCL's distribution, which we continue
to use, we also needed to establish a better service presence;
for customers, that means HP people, not joint venture people.
. We really didn't have an adequate picture of the financial condition
of the joint venture. There was some lack of trust between the
two joint venture partners.
These company decisions suggest that foreign MNCs prefer
control over their Indian operations, and when regulations permit
it, they move from joint ventures to wholly owned subsidiaries, even
in India, if they have sufficient experience. In addition, trade is
substituted for investment when reduced tariffs make that economical.
Knowledge Transfer
The amount and type of knowledge that foreign companies
transfer to Indian business operations depends on their degree of
control over the business and on the value of the knowledge. In
the information technology industry, the protection of intellectual
property rights is not a primary concern, even in India, according
to three case studies. Rather, the management of knowledge depends
on competitive market place considerations.
Hughes has proprietary aspects of its data transmission
technology. Some of this knowledge resides in software that was
invented by Hughes and is patented in the U.S. (it cannot be patented
in India) or is a trade secret. Hughes licenses this technology
to HECL for use in Indian business operations in return for payment
of a fixed fee and a royalty rate. But Hughes managers are not very
concerned about the protection of intellectual property that is
transferred to HECL, for two reasons. First, Hughes has majority
ownership and management control. Second, loss of bits of proprietary
knowledge is not a competitive threat.
Companies with valuable intellectual property
will either go for 100% wholly owned subsidiaries or a joint venture
with an Indian partner of the highest integrity. If majority ownership
is permitted, there will be more foreign direct investment. The
biggest technology transfer issue is the trustworthiness and integrity
of the Indian partner. . Competitive advantage in this business
comes from the integration among equipment, data transmission
protocols, and customer service. Proprietary knowledge possessed
by employees is not a matter of knowing how a data switch works
or even knowing how data reach their destination. To know either
of these is not enough.
Sprint RPG managers reinforced this point. The risk
of loss of proprietary technology when employees leave is less than
imagined because it is unlikely that one employee can possess enough
overall knowledge to become a competitive threat outside the company.
Sprint RPG possesses organizational knowledge - the combination of
high-end Tandem hardware, proprietary software, and the know-how to
set up the system and run the business - that is difficult to replicate.
For Indian companies like Escorts, liberalization
of trade policies means that in the future the incentive to form
joint ventures with foreign companies to obtain technology will
be diminished. An Escorts Group manager said,
Why would we pay for technology from a foreign
company to assemble a product from imported parts when in three
years our advantage due to tariff protection of the finished product
goes away? (The Information Technology Agreement in WTO is effective
in 2000.) What we need to do is to build low-cost technology development
businesses. We need to combine purchased and locally developed
technology with low wage labor to be competitive.
Sprint transferred technology to its Indian joint venture
in the form of software for running the email service. Initially Sprint
did not transfer the source code that is required to understand how
the software works. Later some of the source code was transferred
to enable local engineers to adapt the software to the needs of Indian
customers. The software is not advanced technology. A Global One manager
said, "Ten years ago Sprint would not have transferred this source
code, when the software was new. There's a technology time lag from
the West to India." However, a Sprint RPG manager had a different
view: "Since we aren't allowed by the Government of India to be an
internet service provider, we have no use for Sprint's latest technology.
That's why it's not transferred."
Sprint is phasing out the use of this software in
the U.S., and therefore will stop maintenance support of it. This
change raises questions about how the software can be supported
and maintained in India in the future? Should Global One transfer
all of the source code to the joint venture? What happens to this
technology if the joint venture breaks up? A Global One manager
said,
In a joint venture, the most important thing
is trust between the joint venture partners. This is more important
than intellectual property rights laws, which depend on implementation
and enforcement. . If Global One had a 100% wholly owned subsidiary,
it would transfer more technology. To transfer advanced, valuable
technologies, you want management control.
.
The Indian legal system is widely agreed to be fair,
but it is slow. If a company such as Global One can't stop illegal
activity such as theft of technology while it is being adjudicated
via means such as injunctions as in the U.S., then the damage is done
even if the case is eventually won. Justice delayed is justice denied.
Hewlett Packard transferred considerable technology
to HCL-HP in its early years. Much of it was tacit process knowledge
carried by movement of people. A senior HP manager was the head
of manufacturing at HCL-HP for 3½ years and an HP expatriate
was head of R&D at HCL-HP. Several other HP technical experts
were located in India, and teams of 10 HCL-HP engineers regularly
spent 3 to 12 month periods at HP's European headquarters in Germany.
Our decisions on technology transfer depend on
HP ownership and control. If we have 100% there is no holding
back. For example, we do software development in a 100% wholly
owned subsidiary in Bangalore. Our 200 HP India employees there
can access the same files as our people in Palo Alto. We do use
non-disclosure agreements. Intellectual property rights protections
are not an issue for us. We also outsource some of this work,
but the 350 contract workers we use who are not HP India employees
cannot see HP proprietary software files. . In a joint venture
we make some different choices. For example, we might do semi-knocked-down
assembly rather than completely integrated manufacturing.
India has adequate intellectual property rights
laws. Maybe enforcement is better in the U.S. . I want import
tariffs to come down so that Indians can afford to buy computers.
This is what my business needs.
HP India managers said their decisions about how to
be in business in India and how to manage technology were affected
by global costs and logistics and Indian trade and investment policies:
Servers and work stations are a low-volume-high-mix
business (high-mix means that the product contains many options
so that each customer's order is somewhat different). When the
tariff on imported finished computers came down enough, the cost
of transferring technology into manufacturing operations, and
the cost of inventory management for the Indian manufacturing
business exceeded the tariff premium borne by finished products
versus parts. Transferring manufacturing process technology is
expensive because expatriates are expensive, and because the transfer
is continual (not one-time) since the technology changes about
every nine months. Inventory management is costly because a high-mix
business requires a large number of different parts. The cost
of capital in India is high so inventory carrying costs are high,
and the parts quickly become technologically obsolete. HP uses
a "virtual manufacturing" strategy: make a product in only one
or two or three places in the world for HP use worldwide; decide
the parts production and product assembly locations based on cost
factors including scale economies; and ship items by air to wherever
they are needed.
These company experiences indicate that in the information
technology sector, TRIPs will surprisingly not have much effect on
knowledge transfer to India. Intellectual property is complex and
difficult to replicate outside the owner's business. Technology changes
rapidly so that what might be patented or copyrighted is not so valuable
only a few years later if it is lost. Despite tough TRIPs standards,
enforcement takes too long, and this is hard for WTO requirements
to affect. Nevertheless, GATS and ITA will affect knowledge transfer.
Foreign companies, despite their declared lack of worry about losing
intellectual property, say they transfer more and better technology
to operations that they control. To the extent that GATS results in
fewer limitations on foreign control of businesses in India, knowledge
transfer of all types will increase, but knowledge absorption into
India will decrease as joint ventures give way to wholly owned subsidiaries.
At the same time, ITA-induced tariff reductions will increase importing
into India and diminish local production. This will switch knowledge
transfer from tacit to explicit, from process to product, and from
embodied to disembodied. Absorption will decrease. These results are
micro substitution results that might be overcome in the aggregate
by scale effects of generally increased business participation in
all modes that follows from trade and investment liberalization.
SOURCES
Almeida, Paul. 1996. "Knowledge Sourcing by Foreign
Multinationals: Patent Citation Analysis in the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry", Strategic Management Journal, vol. 17 (Winter
Special Issue), pp. 155-165.
Appleyard, Melissa M 1996. "How Does Knowledge Flow:
Interfirm Patterns in the Semi-conductor Industry," Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 17 (Winter Special Issue), pp. 137-154.
Brewer, Thomas L. 1993. "Government Policies, Market
Imperfections, and Foreign Direct Investment," Journal of International
Business Studies, vol. 24, no. 1 (1st Quarter), pp. 101-120.
Brewer, Thomas L. 1993. "Foreign Direct Investment
in Emerging Market Countries," Ch. 7 in Oxelheim, Lars (ed.), The
Global Race for Foreign Direct Investment, pp. 177-204. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
Brewer, Thomas L. and Young, Stephen. 1998. The
Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brewer, Thomas L. and Young, Stephen. 1996. "Investment
Policies in Multilateral and Regional Agreements: A Comparative
Analysis," Transnational Corporations, vol 5, no 1 (April),
pp. 9-36.
Brewer, Thomas L. and Young, Stephen. 1995. "The
Multilateral Agenda for Foreign Direct Investment: Problems, Principles,
and Priorities for Negotiations at the OECD and WTO," World Competition,
vol. 18, no. 4 (June), pp. 67-83.
Buckley, Peter J. 1996. "Government Policy Responses
to Strategic Rent-Seeking Transnational Firms, presented at conference
on Globalisation et Regionalisation, Universite Paris-I Pantheon-Sorbonne
(May)
Cantwell, John. 1991. "A Survey of Theories of International
Production," in Pitelis, Christos N. and Sugden, Roger (eds.), The
Nature of the Transnational Firm. London: Routledge (pp. 16-64).
Cantwell, John. 1989. Technological Innovation
and Multinational Corporations. New York: Blackwell.
Caves, Richard E. 1996. Multinational Enterprise
and Economic Analysis (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Chen, Edward (ed.) 1994. Transnational Corporations
and Innovatory Activities. London: Routledge (for the United
Nations).
Dunning, John H. 1993. Multinational Enterprises
and the Global Economy. Wokingham, England: Addison-Wesley.
Dunning, John H. 1995. "Reappraising the Eclectic
Paradigm in an Age of Alliance Capitalism," Journal of International
Business Studies, vol. 28, no. 3 (Third Quarter), pp. 463-491.
Dunning, John H. 1993. The Globalization of Business.
London: Routledge, Ch. 8, Cross-Border Technology Alliances (pp.
190-219); Ch. 9, The Prospects for Foreign Direct Investment in
Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 220-241)
Grant, Robert M., 1966. "Toward a Knowledge Based
Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, vol. 17
(Winter Special Issue), pp. 109-122.
Inkpen, Andrew C. 1996. "Creating Knowledge Through
Collaboration," California Management Review, vol. 39, no.
1, pp. 123-140.
Inkpen, Andrew C. and Dinur, Adva. 1996. "Knowledge
Management Processes and International Joint Ventures." Glendale,
AZ: Thunderbird Business Research Center Discussion Paper 96-4.
Inkpen, Andrew. 1995. The Management of International
Joint Ventures: An Organizational Learning Perspective. London:
Routledge. Chs. 5-7, 10 (pp. 46-89, 121-127)
Kim, Linsu. 1991 "Pros and Cons of International
Technology Transfer: A Developing Country's View," in Agmon, Tamir
and Von Glinow, Mary Ann (eds.), Technology Transfer in International
Business. New York: Oxford University Press (pp. 223-239).
Kogut, Bruce and Zander, Udo. 1993. "Knowledge of
the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation,"
Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 24, no. 5
(Fourth Quarter), pp. 625-645.
Mansfield, Edwin. 1994. Intellectual Property
Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer,
Discussion Paper No. 19. Washington DC: International Finance Corporation.
Ostry, Sylvia and Gestrin, Michael. 1993. "Foreign
Direct Investment, Technology Transfer, and the Innovation-Network
Model," Transnational Corporations, vol. 2, no. 3 (pp. 7-30).
Pucik, Vladimir. 1991. "Technology Transfers in Strategic
Alliances: Competitive Collaboration and Organizational Learning,"
in Agmon, Tamir and Von Glinow, Mary Ann (eds.), Technology Transfer
in International Business. New York: Oxford University Press,
pp. 121-138).
Rugman, Alan M. 1980. "A New Theory of the Multinational
Enterprise: Internationalization versus Internalization," Columbia
Journal of World Business, vol XV, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 23-29.
Sauve, Pierre. 1994. "A First Look at Investment
in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round," Journal of World Trade,
vol. 28, no. 5 (October), pp. 5-16.
Sauve, Pierre. 1995. "Assessing the General Agreement
on Trade in Services: Half Full or Half Empty?" Journal of World
Trade, vol. 29, no. 4 (August).
Siddarthan, N.S. and Safarian, A.E. 1997. "Transnational
Corporations, Technology Transfer, and Imports of Capital Goods:
The Recent Indian Experience," Transnational Corporations,
vol. 6, no. 1 (April), pp. 31-50.
Smith, Alister. 1995. "The Development of a Multilateral
Investment Agreement at the OECD: A Preview," in Green, Carl J.
and Brewer, Thomas L. (eds), International Investment Issues
in the Asia Pacific Region and the Role of APEC. NewYork: Oceana.
United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations.
1987. Transnational Corporations and Technology Transfer: Effects
and Policy Issues. New York. United Nations.
World Investment Report 1995. 1995. Transnational
Corporations and Competitiveness, Chapter III, Access to Resources.
New York: United Nations, (pp. 149-168).
Table 1
Summary of WTO Agreements
| WTO SECTIONS AND MAIN PROVISIONS |
| TRIPs - Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights |
| Basic principles:
National treatment and Most favored nation
status provided
|
| Specific standards:
Patents protected for products or processes for
20 years from filing date, effective with 1995 filings.
Copyrights protected for 50 years, including software,
databases, recordings, performances, and broadcasts (20 years);
rental rights reserved for copyright holders.
Trademarks and service marks protected for 7 years,
renewable indefinitely; canceled if not used for 3 years;
compulsory licensing and linking of foreign trademark to local
trademark prohibited.
Integrated circuit designs protected 10 years;
compulsory licensing of semiconductor technology barred
Industrial designs protected for 10 years.
Trade secrets protected from unauthorized use.
Anti-competitive practices in licensing contracts
that violate intellectual property rights may be remedied,
and restrictive business practices by intellectual property
holders may be prevented.
|
| Enforcement:
Fair and equitable procedures established, with civil
legal channels and criminal prosecution of infringers, cease
and desist orders, payment of damages, and impoundment and
destruction of goods.
|
| Timetable:
Developing countries implement by January 2000; least
developed countries by January 2006
|
| GATS - General
Agreement on Trade in Services |
| Four modes of services supply
defined:
Cross-border supply (exports and imports; e.g., money
transfer by banks, consultant's report on disk)
Consumption abroad (consumer moves to country of supplier;
e.g., tourism)
Commercial presence (supplier moves to country of consumer;
e.g., foreign direct investment)
Movement of natural persons (supplier's employee moves
to country of consumer; e.g., expatriates)
|
| General obligations established:
Most favored nation status provided, but with exceptions
specified by countries for certain sectors for 5-10 years,
regional free trade pacts, and government procurement.
Transparency promoted - measures affecting services
trade and investment to be made publicly available at "inquiry
points" to be established by January 1997; changes to be notified
to WTO.
Restrictive business practices by monopoly service
suppliers that distort competition and restrain trade to be
eliminated; monopoly suppliers cannot act contrary to MFN.
Harmonized international standards for authorizing, licensing,
certifying suppliers encouraged not req'd.
|
| Specific commitments offered by
countries for certain sectors (positive lists)
that may include restrictions and exceptions
(negative lists).
Market access to be provided by changes in domestic
regulatins in sectors for which commitments made.
International payments for current or financial
account transactions are to be unrestricted in all sectors
for which commitments are made except for balance of payments
reasons.
National treatment can be extended or not, sector
by sector, with conditions and qualifications allowed.
Developing countries can offer fewer liberalizations
and impose more limitations (e.g., by requiring joint ventures
or technology transfer in foreign investments).
Sectoral commitments (as of March 1998):
Telecommunication: Access to public networks and
services is to be provided to all suppliers except broadcast
and cable radio and television (access means no quotas, preferably
no limits on foreign equity stakes in direct investments);
developing and least developed countries may impose conditions
to improve their domestic infrastructure and international
trade participation. [Details differ from country to country.]
Basic telecommunication (commitments made by 69
countries in February 1997):
Access to public basic and international telecom networks
and services and satellites is to be provided on a reasonable
and nondiscriminatory basis.
Foreign ownership or control of telecom services and facilities
is permitted.
Pro-competitive regulatory principles are guaranteed.
[Details for each country's specific commitments differ
from country to country.]
Other sectors included in GATS are maritime services,
air transport, and financial services
|
| TRIMs - Trade-Related
Investment Measures - incentives or requirements applied to
foreign investment in manufactured goods that affect trade |
| Measures inconsistent with principles
of national treatment or elimination of quotas are prohibited:
Local content requirements are prohibited.
Trade balancing requirements (exports=imports)
are prohibited.
Foreign exchange neutrality requirements are prohibited.
Domestic sales requirements tied to export sales
are prohibited
Subsidies contingent on export performance are prohibited
(see section on subsidies and countervailing measures), but
not export performance requirements themselves.
|
| Timetable:
Developing countries must implement by January 2000; transitional
economies by January 2002
|
| SCMs - Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures - financial contributions provided
directly or indirectly by a government which confer a benefit
to certain enterprises (e.g., grants, loans, loan guarantees,
tax credits, government purchases, price supports). |
| Prohibited subsidies (red
light subsidies):
Export subsidies contingent on export performance
or local content
Timetable: Developing countries implement by January 2003;
least developed countries exempted.
Domestic subsidies that are contingent on the use
of domestic rather than imported goods.
Timetable: Developing countries implement by January 2000;
least developed countries by January 2003.
Permissible subsidies that may be countervailed (amber
light subsidies) - subsidies that are specific to particular
companies, industries, or regions, and cause serious injury
to domestic industry in other WTO member countries (e.g.,
subsidies that exceed 5% of product value or forgive corporate
debt or cover operating losses more than once).
Permissible subsidies that may not be countervailed (green
light subsidies) - subsidies that are not specific and are
paid on the basis of objective economic criteria (e.g., subsidies
for industrial research and environmental protection; subsidies
less than 2% of value or 4% of import volume) by developing
countries may not be investigated for countervailing duties.
Permanent Group of Experts is established to make determinations
prior to dispute settlement
|
|
Information Technology Agreement (December
1996)
|
| Eliminate tariffs on information
technology products by year 2000.
Telecommunications equipment: telephones, cordless
handsets, answering machines, videophones, fax machines, pagers,
switches, magnetic tapes, laser discs, transmission apparatus
(but not radio or television broadcasting apparatus), antennas,
capacitors, resistors, liquid crystal devices, light-emitting
diodes, transistors, photocells, smart cards, optical fibre
cables, photocopiers.
Computer equipment: portable computers, workstations,
mainframe computers, supercomputers, peri-pherals and parts
such as flat panel displays, cathode ray monitors (but not
televisions), plotters, multi-media devices with speakers
or microphones, modems, hard disk drives, compact disk drives,
semiconduc-tors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, integrated
circuits, microprocessors, wafers, calculators.
|
Notes:
Definitions: Most favored nation status means
that no nation, WTO member or not, can be treated less favorably
than another. National treatment means that treatment for
foreign entities (advantages, favors, privileges, or immunities)
can be no less favorable than that afforded to a country's own nationals.
Transparency refers to a nation's laws, regulations, rules,
and enforcement, and is intended to promote stability and predictability.
Summaries of regulations are incomplete. The Uruguay
Round also includes sections on (1) Tariff reductions, (2) Anti-dumping,
(3) Safeguards or escape clauses, (4) Dispute settlement procedures,
(5) Agriculture trade, and (6) Textiles and apparel trade.
Souces:
Brewer, Thomas L. and Young, Stephen. 1996. "Investment
Policies in Multilateral and Regional Agreements: A Comparative
Analysis," Transnational Corporations, vol. 5, no. 1 (April),
pp. 9-35.
Evans, Phillip and Walsh, James. 1994. The EIU
Guide to the New GATT. London: Economist Intelligence Unit,
1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 1994. Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal
Texts. Geneva: GATT Secretariat
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 1994. Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 1b, General
Agreement on Trade in Services, vol. 29.
Schott, Jeffrey J. 1994. Uruguay Round: An Assessment.
Washington DC: Institute for Int'l Economics
United Nations Centre for Trade and Development,
International Trade Centre of the World Trade Organization, and
Commonwealth Secretariat. 1995. Business Guide to the Uruguay
Round. Geneva.
U.S. International Trade Administration. 1994. "Uruguay
Round Update." Washington DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Table 2
Potential for Knowledge Transfer in Different International Business
Modes
(x mark indicates that the knowledge feature is
capable of being transferred or achieved by
the specified international business mode)
KNOWLEDGE
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MODE
FEATURE
|
Exporting |
Licensing |
FDI-WOS |
FDI-JV |
Alliance |
| Type of Knowledge |
|
|
|
|
|
| Explicit |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
| Tacit |
|
|
x |
x |
x |
| Product |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
| Process |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
| Embodied |
x |
|
x |
x |
x |
| Disembodied |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
| Knowledge Dynamics |
|
|
|
|
|
| Adaptation |
|
|
x |
x |
x |
| Absorption |
|
x |
|
x |
x |
| Creation |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table 3
Hypothesized Relative Effects of WTO Agreements on International
Business Mode
(x mark indicates benefit for the international
business mode relative to others;
minus mark indicates disadvantage for the mode)
| WTO agreements provide: |
Trade |
License |
FDI-WOS |
FDI-JV |
Alliance |
| Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights
Standards for patents, copyrights, trademarks,
integrated circuits, industrial designs, trade secrets
Bars to anti-competitive practices in licensing
contracts that violate intellectual property rights
Enforcement procedures and penalties
|
|
x
x
x
|
|
x
x
|
x
x
|
| General Agreement on Trade in Services
Market access, unrestricted international payments,
and national treatment for sectors with commitments made
Telecommunication sector: Access to public
networks and services by foreign companies, foreign ownership
of services and facilities, and pro-competitive regulations
|
|
|
x
x
|
x
(>51%)
x
(>51%)
|
|
| Trade-Related Investment Measures
Bars against local content, trade balancing,
and foreign exchange neutrality requirements, and domestic
sales tied to export sales among manufactured products
|
x
|
|
x
-
|
x
-
|
|
| Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Bars against export subsidies
Bars against domestic subsidies contingent
on use of domestic rather than imported goods
Other subsidies specific to companies, industries,
regions that are >5% of product value, forgive debts, or cover
losses may be countervailed
|
x
x
|
|
-
x
|
-
x
|
-
x
|
| International Technology Agreement
Elimination of tariffs on telecommunications
and computer products
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
| Reduction of tariffs |
x |
|
|
|
|
Figure 1
Model to Explain Effects of WTO Rules on Knowledge Transfer
Figure 2
Description of Telecommunication Industry in Conformance
with WTO Definitions
| |
|
Telecommunication
Transmission of voice or data messages from senders to receivers
by electromagnetic means
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
Products
Switching equipment including exchanges
Trasmission equipment (e.g.,cables, modularos, microwave radios
Terminal or end user equipment (e.g., telephones, faxes, pagers)
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
Basic Telecommiunication Services
Transmission of customer's infromation without changing form
or content
voice telephone
telex and telgraph
fax
leased circuits
data transmission
satelite systems
|
|
|
|
Value-added Telecom Services
Value added to customer's
information by supplier by changing form or content or by
storage or retrieval
voice mail
email
cellular mobile telephone
radio paging
video conferencing
data processing, storage, retrieval
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources:
"The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications,"
17 February 1997, http://www.insidetrade.com/ sec-cgi; "The National
Telecommunication Policy of India," in "The Indian Budget '96-'97."
APPENDIX I
INDIAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY
Indian trade and investment policy for the information
technology sector consists of the Indian response to its WTO obligations
that affect all industries, and that apply to the telecommunication
and computer industries specifically. The policy framework also
consists of Indian trade and investment policies, and industrial
policies that regulate these industries, apart from WTO rules.
Foreign Direct Investment
The "National Telecom Policy" of May 1994 contains
a statement of principle about foreign direct investment. It recognizes
the need to attract foreign investment because private investment
will be needed to supply resources not available from government
funds or internal resources. It says that India should become a
major manufacturing base and exporter of telecom equipment.
Foreign Equity Stakes. Foreign direct investments
with equity stakes up to 74 percent are automatically approved by
the Reserve Bank of India for nine industries. Foreign equity stakes
up to 51 percent are automatically approved for another 48 industries,
including telecom and computer equipment, and investments up to
50 percent are automatically approved for another three industries.
However, telecom services are not among any of these (Table 4).
Investment proposals for other industries are reviewed by the Foreign
Investment Promotion Board, and most are approved within four to
six weeks. Foreign investment in telecom equipment businesses may
reach 100 percent with FIPB approval. About 90 percent of all foreign
investment proposals go through the FIPB approval route. Some industries
continue to be reserved for the small scale sector (not telecom
or computers), in which foreign equity stakes cannot exceed 24 percent
unless three-quarters of the enterprise's output is exported.
India's specific commitments under GATS list maximum
foreign equity stakes in telecommuni-cations and related industries.
Foreign investments in the value-added telecom services industry
require specific government approval and are limited to a 51 percent
foreign stake, except for radio paging and cellular mobile telephone
services in which it is 49 percent. The maximum foreign ownership
in basic telecom services is 49 percent. In the computer services
and engineering services industries, the FDI stake is a maximum
of 51 percent.
There is no domestic content requirement for telecom
investments (there is in other industries such as motor vehicles).
National treatment is accorded, except that foreign companies pay
a 48 percent income tax rate while Indian companies pay 35 percent.
India is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee agency
of the World Bank, so foreign investments are insured against expropriation
or nationalization.
Telecommunication is treated as infrastructure in
foreign direct investment approvals, and is eligible for fiscal
benefits including a five-year tax holiday and concessional import
duties (see below).
Export Oriented Units can be created and Export Processing
Zones have been established (seven of them) that permit 100 percent
foreign equity in any industry and provide incentives such as no
import quotas, licenses, or tariffs; no excise tax on locally sourced
inputs; a five year income tax holiday; and no income tax on export
earnings after the tax holiday. Electronic Hardware Technology Parks
and Software Technology Parks have been established for export-oriented
units. However, export processing zones have attracted relatively
little foreign investment (Debroy 1997).
Foreign Exchange and Payments. The rupee exchange
rate is market-determined, although the Reserve Bank of India engages
in considerable exchange rate management periodically. The rupee
is convertible on current account and on capital account for foreign
investors. Both profits and capital disinvestments may be repatriated
freely. However, full capital account convertibility has not been
achieved because transactions by Indian investors are restricted.
There are no trade balancing or foreign exchange neutrality requirements
except for 22 major consumer goods industries (including motor vehicles,
food products, electronics, and white goods) for which dividend
repatriation must be balanced with foreign exchange earnings. In
other payments regulations, automatic approval is given for technology
fees up to Rs.10 million payable as part of foreign direct investments.
Indian companies may raise funds from international capital markets.
Technology Transfer. According to the National
Telecom Policy, technology inflow should be made easy by public
policy, and India should not lag behind in getting the full advantage
of new technologies. Indigenous technology is to be encouraged,
including funding for indigenous R&D. In cases of public tenders,
the usefulness of technology for future development is one of several
criteria for winning a tender. Pilot projects are encouraged to
access new technologies systems in basic and value-added telecommunica-tions.
In India's horizontal commitments under GATS, preference in all
industries will be given to foreign firms with the best technology
transfer terms in joint venture proposals with government enterprises.
There are some technology transfer restrictions in
the details. Lump sum payments for technology transfer may not exceed
$2 million after taxes for automatic approvals. Foreign technicians
who are not part of a foreign collaboration may be hired not longer
than 12 months and paid no more than $1,000 per day; total Indian
company payments to foreign companies may not exceed $200,000 per
year.
Imports and Exports
Quotas and Licenses. Imports of capital goods
and components used in manufacturing are not subject to quotas and
do not require licenses, including second-hand capital goods (with
a life of five years), except for a few items on a negative list.
This is in sharp contrast to the pre-reform period when as recently
as 1990 over 80 percent of all imports were subject to licensing.
However, foreign direct investments that qualify for automatic approval
must import new and not used plant and equipment if any is imported.
Imports of consumer goods (goods that can directly
satisfy human needs without further processing) are heavily restricted.
There are four categories of restrictions: (1) Prohibited imports
(zero quotas), which is a short list of 16 animal products with
religious significance; (2) Restricted imports, which are 2,339
products that can be imported only if a license is granted by the
government against a quota that can be zero (these are mainly consumer
goods, fertilizer, petroleum products, textiles and clothing, and
agricultural products; (3) Products whose import requires a special
import license to be obtained from the central government (there
are 733 products on this list as of 1997); and (4) Canalized imports,
which may be imported only by the government (there are 102 products
on this list as of 1997). All other products, numbering about 7,300
in the current classification system, are on an open general list,
which means that no quantitative restrictions apply (Debroy 1997).
The Government of India negotiated with the WTO in
1997 about a timetable for removing these quotas, or quantitative
restrictions, as they are termed in India, which it must do for
WTO compliance. The U.S., joined by the EU and Japan, had filed
a complaint against India about the pace of Indian compliance.
Among telecom products, import licenses are required
to import telephone instruments. Tradeable licenses (special import
licenses) are required to import cordless telephones, telephone
answering machines, transceivers, pagers, cellular telephones, satellite
receivers, and video telephones. Import of other telecom equipment
including fax machines is not subject to quotas.
Tariffs. The import tariff on capital goods
is a flat 20 percent, but it may be reduced or waived for imports
of raw materials used for export production. The tariff is 10 percent
for import of capital goods contingent on an export performance
requirement to export four times their value in five years, and
the tariff is zero if six times the value of the capital goods is
exported within eight years and that value exceeds $200 million.
The import tariff on telecommunications parts and subassemblies
was 30 percent as of 1996/97, down from 35 percent a year earlier
(the compound year comes from the goverrnment's budget year that
runs from March - February). The average tariff over all imports
in 1995/96 was about 45 percent; in 1996/97 it was 33 percent. The
maximum tariff was 50 percent in 1995/96 and 40 percent in 1996/97.
However, two separate and temporary tariff surcharges imposed in
during 1997 for fiscal reasons added five percent to most tariffs
(except for duty-free imports).
India signed the WTO Information Technology Agreement
in 1997, which mandates tariff reductions to zero by the year 2000
for listed telecom and computer equipment. Another important trade
provision is that export profits are exempt from income tax, and
export commissions of up to 10 percent are permitted.
Intellectual Property Rights
Indian copyright law was changed in 1994 to improve protection
of performer's rights (the law provides rental rights for video
cassettes, and protection for works transmitted by satellite or
cable), limit judicial discretion to levy penalties, speed up prosecution
at the state level, strengthen local police search and seizure authority,
and establish a Copyright Enforcement Advisory Council to develop
policy.
Trademarks are accorded national treatment. It is planned to include
servicemarks in Indian statutes (they are currently given non-statutory
court protection). The use of foreign marks is permitted but requires
registration that can be denied. Business collaborations that include
foreign investment and technology transfer are more likely to be
permitted to use foreign marks.
Patent protection will be brought into conformance with TRIPs requirements
by extending product patent protection to the food, chemicals, and
pharmaceuticals industries (previously there was only process patent
protection in these industries for 7 years), and by extending product
patent life from 14 years to 20. During the transition period to
year 2005, exclusive marketing rights will be granted for a five
year period.
The maximum recurring royalty payment and patent license payment
is 8 percent of selling price after taxes for export sales for a
maximum of 7 years, and 5 percent for domestic sales. Royalties
and lump sum payments are taxed at a 20 percent rate.
Extended protection of industrial designs from 5 years initially
with two further 5 year renewal periods is under consideration.
APPENDIX II
INDIAN TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
The telecommunication industry worldwide is large and fast growing.
Telecom revenues worldwide in 1995 were estimated to be $602 billion,
up seven percent over the previous year. The industry accounts /for
more than two percent of world GDP. About 20 percent of the telecom
industry's output of products and services is exported, with a growth
rate more than double that of the overall industry. It is a global
industry, increasingly characterized by cross-border strategic alliances
among service providers such as Global One and Unisource. The leading
equipment manufacturers - Lucent, Motorola, Ericsson, Alcatel, Siemens,
Nortel, NEC, and Nokia represent a range of countries.
The telecommunication industry was dominated in the past by monopoly
public utilities, often state-owned. Now the industry is being deregulated
and privatized. While less than half of global telecom revenue was
open to competition in 1997, close to 90 percent of the business
is expected to be competitive after a few years, due partly to WTO
(Financial Times, September 10, 1997).
The telecommunication business in India is sizable, growing, and
changing. In physical terms, the number of telephone lines totaled
14.1 million in 1997, which made India the14th biggest
in the world. In financial terms, the total expenditure on telecommunication
services and equipment in India was $6,500 million in 1995, which
accounted for one percent of the world market. Telecom service revenue
in India exceeds its Asian neighbors such as Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand, and among European countries, India exceeds
Denmark, Norway, Greece, and Poland.
These fairly big numbers occur because India is a big country,
but its telecom market is only beginning to be developed. In terms
of telephone density, India has one of the lowest figures in the
world: 1.3 connections per 100 people in 1996, compared to a worldwide
average of about 10 and a Chinese figure of 1.7 (the U.S. has about
58 connections per 100 people). Growth in the telecom sector has
been very rapid during the five years since the liberalizations
of 1991. The number of telephone lines has doubled, telephone density
has doubled, and international telephone traffic has tripled.
Along with growth has come change. Until the mid-1980s, both the
provision of telecom services and the production of equipment were
entirely state-owned and controlled. Since then a measure of competition
has been introduced, private companies including foreign multinational
corporations have entered the business, and a range of value-added
services has been launched.
Basic Telecommunications. Local and domestic long distance
telephone, telex, telegraph, and fax service through fixed wires
are provided by government monopolies. An agency of the central
government, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), operates
in all regions of the country except in Mumbai and Delhi, and a
separate government-owned monopoly enterprise, Mahanagar Telephone
Nigam Ltd. (MTNL), created in 1986,supplies services for Mumbai
and Delhi. MTNL had sales revenue of Rs 30 billion in 1995 (about
$860 million) and profits before tax of Rs 9.8 billion (about $280
million).
However, the government is converting local basic fixed wire telephone
service (but not long distance) into a duopoly by licensing one
private company to compete with DoT in each of 18 "circles", which
are geographic regions corresponding roughly to Indian states. This
initiative was launched in 1995 with public tenders, and service
began in October 1997 in Madhya Pradesh. The introduction of competition
in basic local telephone service is remarkable, but it has been
slow to develop in part because of regulatory and technological
issues and uncertainties about fees to be paid by licensees to the
government. Although the government relaxed some its conditions,
some bidding companies subsequently had second thoughts about the
economic viability of the business and were slow to commit funds
and launch service. Nine consortia of companies were awarded licenses
in 13 circles, but only four had paid license fees as of mid-1997.
Basic international telecommunication services are provided by
a separate government enterprise, Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL)
(The Hindi words translate into Foreign Communication Company).
VSNL had sales in 1996 of Rs 51.9 billion (about $1.5 billion),
which was an increase of 17 percent from 1995, with profits before
taxes of Rs 8.4 (about $240 million). Employment at VSNL was 2,800
in 1995.
Value-Added Telecommunication. Value-added telecommunication
services such as e-mail, cellular mobile telephone, radio paging,
and satellite data transmission were first available in India in
1995. For cellular and paging services where the number of providers
is technically limited by the availability of radio frequencies,
the government awarded licenses to companies by a public tender
process in 1994. Mobile cellular service is provided by two private
companies in each of the four metros and 18 other circles (Table
5). All of these companies are joint ventures between Indian and
foreign MNCs. Radio paging service was separately licensed to 19
companies in 27 cities; service began in 12 cities in 1995. For
services where there is no technical limitation on the number of
firms in a market, such as e-mail and satellite data transmission,
there are several firms providing each service nationwide. These
are joint ventures with foreign MNCs.
International value-added telecom remains a state monopoly operated
by VSNL. VSNL provides international leased lines, television relays,
video conferencing, satellite communications, packet-switched data
transmission, electronic data interchange, e-mail, and internet
access. Although there are other internet service providers, each
much use the gateways that VSNL controls. Private firms may use
their own networks, but all depend on VSNL facilities. Of VSNL's
total revenue, one-third came from DoT and two-thirds from foreign
telecom companies; 92 percent of VSNL revenue was earned from basic
telephone service. The Government of India will evaluate the monopoly
status of VSNL by the year 2004.
Regulation. Until 1997, DoT was both a telephone service
provider and regulator. In January 1997, a new independent regulatory
agency, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was created,
reporting to the Indian parliament.
Equipment. Telecommunications equipment
manufacture was formerly done only by two government-owned companies,
Indian Telephone Industries and Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd. Equipment
manufacture was opened to the private sector in 1984 and opened
to foreign-invested companies in 1991.
Table 4
Industries and Equity Stakes That Qualify for
Automatic Foreign Direct Investment Approval in India
|
Industries
|
Maximum Foreign Equity Stake (%) |
| Mining services, some metals industries,
electric power generation, construction, water transport, warehousing,
other manufacturing industries not listed below, notably scientific
instruments and optical equipment |
74 |
| Some metals and metal products industries;
boilers, turbines, and engines; electrical equipment; transportation
equipment and services; machinery and machine tools; industrial
instruments; fertilizers; chemicals; pharmaceuticals; paper;
rubber products; glass; ceramics and industrial diamonds; building
materials; carbon products; food processing; textiles; software;
business services; tourism |
51 |
| Three mining industries |
up to 50 |
Note: Foreign investments in other industries require
approval from Foreign Investment Promotion Board
Source: Government of India, Indian Investment Centre,
Foreign Investment Policy of the Government of India. New
Delhi, May 1997.
Table 5
Structure of the Indian Telecommunication Industry
|
SECTOR
|
DOMESTIC
|
INTERNATIONAL
|
| Basic services: Telephone, telex,
telegraph, fax, leased lines, data transmission |
Government enterprises: DoT, MTNL (monopolies
until 1997, then competition for local telephone service) |
Government monopoly:
VSNL |
Value-added services:
Voice mail, e-mail, cellular, paging, videoconferencing, data
processing/storage/retrieval |
Two private companies (foreign joint
ventures) for cellular service in each of 22 regions; similar
for paging; several private companies and government agencies
for e-mail |
Government monopoly:
VSNL |
Equipment manufacturing:
Switching, transmission, end-user equipment |
Private companies including
foreign joint ventures plus two state-owned companies |
Source: See text
Table 6
Ten Largest Telecom Companies Worldwide and in India
|
company
|
BUSINESS |
1996 REVENUE
$ MILLION |
| Worldwide |
| Nippon Telephone & Telegraph
(Japan) |
Services |
78,300 |
| AT&T (US) |
Services |
74,500 |
| IRI (Italy) |
Services |
49,100 |
| Deutsche Telecom (Germany) |
Services |
41,900 |
| France Telecom (France) |
Services |
29,600 |
| British Telecom (Britain) |
Services |
23,700 |
| GTE (US) |
Services |
21,300 |
| Bell South (US) |
Services |
19,000 |
| Ericsson (Sweden) |
Equipment |
18,800 |
| MCI (US) |
Services |
18,500 |
| India |
| Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd |
Services* |
1,503 |
| Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd |
Services* |
1,132 |
| Indian Telephone Industries |
Equipment* |
297 |
| Telecommunication Consultants India
Ltd |
Consultancy* |
143 |
| Sterlite Industries |
Equipment |
140 |
| Alcatel Modi Network Systems (foreign) |
Equipment** |
117 |
| Global Telesystems |
Equipment |
106 |
| Hindustan Cables |
Equipment* |
93 |
| Usha Beltron |
Equipment |
79 |
| Finolex Cables |
Equipment |
71 |
* State-owned companies; each is part of the
Department of Telecommunication
** Foreign-invested joint venture company
Note: HCL Infosystems, created in 1997, would
have had revenue in 1996 of $180 million.
Source: Financial Times, October 2, 1997
for worldwide; Voice & Data, vol. 4, no. 1, July
1997 for India
Table 7
Domestic Telecom Service Providers in India
| MARKET AREA |
CELLULAR MOBILE TELEPHONE
SERVICES
(brand name in italics when different from
company name)
|
BASIC LOCAL SERVICES |
| Four Metros |
|
Delhi
|
Bharti Cellular - AirTel.
Bharti Televentures 51%, British Telecom 22½,
EMTEL (Mauritius) 17%, Mobile Systems Int'l (UK) 4½%,
Telecom Italia 2%, NRIs 3%
Essar Cellphone - Essar. Essar
Group 50%, Swiss Telecom 30%, Sterling Cellular 20%
|
under judicial review |
| Mumbai
(Bombay)
|
Hutchison Max - MaxTouch.
Hutchison Whampoa (Hong Kong), Distacom 20%
BPL Mobile - BPL West. BPL Group
49%, France Telecom 37%, LCC Inc 14%
|
covered under
Maharashtra State
|
| Calcutta |
Modi Telstra. Modi
Group 50.1%, Telstra (Australia) 49%
Usha Martin - Command. Usha Martin
Industries 51%, Telecom Malaysia 40%, foreign portfolio investors
9%
|
covered under West Bengal State |
| Chennai
(Madras)
|
RPG Cellular. RPG
Group 51%, Airtouch [Itochu] (Mauritius) 49%
Skycell. Crompton Greaves, BellSouth
(US), Millicom, DSS Enterprises
|
covered under Tamil Nadu |
| Regional
"Circles" (States) |
| Andhra Pradesh |
Tata Teleservices. Tata
Industries 51%, Bell Canada 39%, AIC (Mauritius) 10%
JT Mobile. United Telecom 31%, Sanmar
Electronics 20%, Telia (Sweden) 26%, Jasmine (Thailand) 13%,
TOT (Thailand) 10%
|
Tata Teleservi-ces. Tata
Indust. 51%, Bell Canada 39%, AIG Maur10% |
| Assam |
Reliance Telecom. Reliance
Industries 52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio
investors 38%
No second operator
|
none |
| Bihar |
Reliance Telecom. Reliance
Industries 52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio
investors 38%
Koshika Telecom. Usha Group 82%, Piltel
(Philippines) 10%, Alcatel (France) 3%, NRIs 5%
|
under judicial review |
| Gujarat |
Fascel. Shinawatra
Int'l Public Co. (Thailand) 33%, Hindujas 30%, Bezeq (Israel)
16%, Kotak Mahindra 11%, Himachal Futuristic Communications
Ltd 10%
Birla Communications. Birla Group 51%,
AT&T (US) 49%
|
Reliance Tele-com. (see
above for ownership structure) |
| Haryana |
Escotel Mobile Communications.
Escorts Group 51%, Personal Communications (Mauritius)
39%, First Pacific (Hong Kong) 10%
Aircell Digilink. Essar Group 60%, Swiss
Telecom 30%, NRIs 10%
|
under judicial review |
| Himachal Pradesh |
Bharti Telenet. Bharti
Telecom 67%, Stet Int'l (Netherlands) 22%, Stet Int'l (Italy)
11%
Reliance Telecom. Reliance Industries
52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio investors
38%
|
under judicial review |
| Jammu & Kashmir |
To be re-tendered |
to be re-tendered |
| Karnataka |
Modicom Networks - Spice
Telecom. Modi Welvest (51%), Distacom
Communications (Mauritius) 39%, Motorola (US) 10%
JT Mobile. United Telecom 31%, Sanmar
Electronics 20%, Telia (Sweden) 26%, Jasmine (Thailand) 13%,
TOT (Thailand) 10%
|
Hughes Ispat
Ispat Industr. 60%, Hughes Electron. (US) 27%,
Alltel Corp (Maur.) 13%
|
| Kerala |
Escotel Mobile Communications. Escorts
Group 51%, Personal Communications (Mauritius) 39%, First Pacific
(Hong Kong) 10%
BPL - US West. BPL Group 51%, US West
49%
|
none |
| Madhya Pradesh |
RPG Airtouch. RPG
Group 51%, Airtouch [Itochu] (Mauritius) 49%
Reliance Telecom. Reliance Industries
52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio investors
38%
|
Bharti Telenet
BhartiTelecom 61%, Telecom Italia 39%
|
| Maharashtra |
BPL - US West. BPL
Group 51%, US West 49%
Birla Communications. Birla Group 51%,
AT&T (US) 49%
|
Hughes Ispat (see
above for ownership structure) |
| North East |
Reliance Telecom. Reliance
Industries 52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio
investors 38%
Hexacom India. Shyam Telecom 40%, TCIL
30%, Mobile Wireless (Maur.) 10%, PCM (US) 10%, Ali &
Faud Mobile Telecom (Kuwait) 10%
|
none |
| Orissa |
Reliance Telecom. Reliance
Industries 52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio
investors 38%
Koshika Telecom. Usha Group 82%, Piltel
(Philippines) 10%, Alcatel (France) 3%, NRIs 5%
|
under judicial review |
| Punjab |
Evergrowth Telecom.. United
Telecom 31%, Sanmar Electronics 20%, Telia (Sweden) 26%, Jasmine
Telecom (Thailand) 13%, TOT (Thailand) 10%
Modicom Networks - Spice Telecom. Modi
Welvest (51%), Distacom Communications (Mauritius) 39%, Motorola
(US) 10%
|
Essar Comm-vision. Essar
51%, Bell Atlantic (US) 10%, Peregrine Asia Infrastruc (HK)
39% |
|
Rajasthan
|
Aircell Digilink. Essar
Group [Sterling Computers] 60%, Swiss Telecom 30%, NRIs 10%
Hexacomm India. Shyam Telecom 40%, TCIL
30%, Mobile Wireless Co (Mauritius) 10%, PCM (US) 10%, Ali
& Faud Mobile Telecom (Kuwait) 10%
|
none |
| Tamil Nadu |
BPL - US West. BPL
Group 51%, US West 49%
Srinivas Cellcom. Srinivas & Partners
51%, Redington (Singapore) 39% , Century Telecom (US) 10%
|
under judicial review |
| Uttar Pradesh (East) |
Aircell Digilink. Essar
Group [Sterling Computers] 60%, Swiss Telecom 30%, NRIs 10%
Koshika Telecom. Usha Group 82%, Piltel
(Philippines) 10%, Alcatel (France) 3%, NRIs 5%
|
none |
| Uttar Pradesh (West) |
Escotel Mobile Communications.
Escorts Group 51%, Personal Communication
(Mauritius) 39%, First Pacific (Hong Kong) 10%
Koshika Telecom. Usha Group 82%, Piltel
(Philippines) 10%, Alcatel (France) 3%, NRIs 5%
|
under judicial review |
| West Bengal |
Reliance Telecom. Reliance
Industries 52%, Nynex (US) 10%, foreign and domestic portfolio
investors 38%
Second operator to be re-tendered
|
none |
Notes:
Basic local telephone services are provided by MTNL
in Delhi and Mumbai and by DoT in all other market areas, and by
the private operator listed in this table.
Companies indicated as (Mauritius) have legal residence
there for particular tax or regulatory reasons but usually have
their corporate headquarters elsewhere.
The details of the ownership structure of some
of the operating companies are incomplete and may contain errors
because there are frequent transactions that result in changes.
NRI means non-resident Indian.
Sources:
Business Standard, "Survey on Telecommunications,"
November 5, 1997; Business Standard, "November 8, 1997, p.
21; Siemens Telecom Ltd., personal communications, Fall 1997; Voice
& Data, vol. 4, no. 1 (July 1997); Voice & Data Newsletter
on Indian Telecom, vol. 1, no. 4 (October 1997).
Table 8
Indian Computer Industry Revenues in 1996-97
|
Product or Service Group
|
Domestic Sales
($ million) |
Export Sales
($ million) |
Total Sales
($ million) |
Change from Year Ago |
| Hardware |
1,121 |
5 |
1,126 |
14.1% |
| Maintenance |
183 |
0 |
183 |
25.3% |
| Peripherals |
277 |
10 |
286 |
24.1% |
| Software |
458 |
995 |
1,453 |
44.3% |
| Training |
183 |
1 |
184 |
44.6% |
| Total |
2,385 |
1,346 |
3,732 |
38.3% |
Note: Dollar figures are converted from rupees at Rs
36 per $.
Source: Dataquest (India), vol XV, no. 13,
July 1997
Table 9
Biggest Computer Companies in India in 1996/97
|
Company
|
Business |
Revenue
($ million)
|
| HCL Group -- HCL-HP,
HCL Consulting, NIIT (National Institute of Information Technology)
[6], other foreign-invested joint ventures |
Hardware, consulting,
training, software |
473 |
| Tata Sons -- Tata Consultancy
Services [2], Tata Information Systems Ltd [5] (joint venture
with IBM), Tata Infotech Ltd [11], other companies |
Consulting, software,
hardware, training, services |
464 |
| Wipro Infotech (joint
venture with Acer[1] |
Hardware, software |
270 |
| Tandon Group -- JTS Technology
[3], Advance Technology Devices [19], Tancom [20], other companies |
Hardware (disk drives) |
262 |
| PCL (Pertech Computers
Ltd) [4] |
Personal computers, servers |
208 |
| Hewlett Packard India
Ltd [7] |
Personal computers, printers |
166 |
| IBM (included in Tata
above) |
Hardware, software |
160 |
| Intel |
|
100 |
| Compaq |
Importer of personal
computers |
100 |
| Digital Equipment India
Ltd [8] |
Hardware |
89 |
| Acer (included in Wipro
Infotech) |
Hardware, software |
74 |
Note: Dollar figures are converted from rupees at Rs
36 per $.
Source: Dataquest (India), vol XV, no. 13, July
1997 |